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11 Introduction
The question of the role and merits of “banks” and “markets” for the func-
tioning of an economy is as topical as it is ill-de…ned. Accordingly, the
answers to this question vary widely with to the position and the perspective
adopted, and often appear contradictory. One reason for this confusion is
that in modern economies, banks of di¤erent types serve several functions in
di¤erent institutional frameworks. Hence, any debate about their role can
only be productive if the context is spelled out clearly. This context is, in par-
ticular, the market environment in which banks operate, which immediately
poses the next problem, namely that “banks are useless in the Arrow-Debreu
world” of perfect markets (Freixas-Rochet, 1997, p. xix). This is no surprise,
of course: if, by assumption, all goods and services are allocated freely and
optimally by the omnipotent auctioneer, then there is no need for institutions
which help to channel …nancial ‡ows through the economy. It is therefore in-
dispensable for any discussion of the role of banks and markets to be explicit
not only about the role of banks but also about the notion of markets.
In this paper, I will study a small part of the grand question, try to
de…ne precisely the type and function of banking under consideration, and
review one particular answer, which relies on a speci…c notion of market
friction. The paper considers commercial banks - institutions that take in
funds from the public in the form of demand deposits and provide …nance
on their own account in the form of loans - and focusses on one particular
economic function they perform, namely the provision of liquidity.
Liquidity provision is usually listed as one of the main macroeconomic
functions of the banking system. Yet, already the de…nition of liquidity is
elusive and would be a worthy subject of a …nancial Sokratian dialogue. The
core of the di¤erent notions of liquidity used in …nance is similar: liquidity
helps agents to realize a …nancial undertaking when they most want it. Yet,
the de…nitions advanced in di¤erent contexts di¤er substantially. Here are
three prominent examples:
1. “An asset is liquid if it can be bought or sold quickly at low transaction
costs and a reasonable price” (Biais-Foucault-Hillion, p. 13).
2. “Liquidity refers to the availability of instruments (market and non-
market) that can be used to transfer wealth across periods” (Holmström-
Tirole, p. 2).
3. An asset is liquid if it allows agents to consume intertemporally as
they would like to.
2The analysis in this paper is mainly based on the third de…nition, in-
troduced by Diamong and Dybvig (1983), not because the other de…nitions
are unnatural, but because it has yielded some interesting and empirically
appealing implications for the theory of banking. I will come back to the
other two de…nitions later on in the paper.
To narrow the scope of the analysis even further, I consider only one
aspect of commercial banking, namely deposit taking. As has been argued
convincingly by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a lot can be learned about
liquidity provision through banks by abstracting from their lending role and
focussing on the liability side of their balance sheets. In fact, this ignores
some interesting aspects of liquidity related to banks’ lending activities, but
these are outside the scope of the present paper.1
Due to space constraints, this paper focusses excessively on my own con-
tribution to the subject. Important other work which has paralleled or in‡u-
enced the ideas presented here but which I cannot discuss, includes Waldo
(1985), Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), Haubrich and King (1990), Mitusch
(1991), Qi (1994), Hellwig (1994), and Hellwig (1998).
2 The Starting Point
2.1 Modelling liquidity demand:
We use as our starting point a slight generalisation of the model of liquidity
demand introduced by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) which
is now standard in the banking and corporate …nance literature. The model
assumes an economy with three dates, t = 0;1;2, one (physical) good, and
a continuum of agents a 2 [0;1] who each have identical endowments of 1 at
date 0, nothing thereafter, and identical preferences over future consumption
at date 0, given by
U(c1;c2) =
(
u(c1) with probability q
u(c2) with probability 1 ¡ q: (1)
The individual consumption shocks of di¤erent agents are realised at date
1, are identically distributed and satisfy the Law of Large Numbers. Hence,
there is no uncertainty about aggregate consumption needs. This utility is
1On lending and liquidity see, in particular, Holmstrn”om and Tirole (1998a, 1998b)
and Diamond and Rajan (1998).
3extreme in the sense that agents only consume once in their lives (they are
either extremely “impatient” or “patient”), but the analysis can be extended
to more general preferences.2 For simplicity, we assume that the elasticity
of instantaneous marginal utility with respect to consumption be constant
(“constant intertemporal relative risk aversion”):
u
0(c) = c
¡a; a > 0: (2)
Individual consumption needsareprivate information. Therefore, if agents
interact, type-dependent consumption allocationsmust be incentive-compatible.
Finally, there is one (real) investment opportunity, which has constant
returns to scale, is arbitrarily divisible, is available to everybody, and yields
a gross return per unit invested at date t of either R1 in t+1 or R2 in t+ 2,
where R2
1 ￿ R2 and R2 > 1. Hence, if investment takes place at time 0 it
can either be “left in place to mature”, or it can be “liquidated early”.
The assumption that R2 > 1 means that the economy is not shrinking and
is made for notational convenience. The assumption that R2
1 ￿ R2 simply
means that the option of leaving the asset in place is meaningful, i.e. not
dominated by liquidating early and reinvesting. If R2
1 < R2, the investment
has an “irreversibility, or goods-in-process, feature” (Wallace, 1988): leaving
the investment in place for two periods yields strictly higher returns than a
sequence of short-term investments.3
2.2 Optimal liquidity:
The model describes a situation in which agents are facing a liquidity prob-
lem, in the sense that they may be forced to consume their investments when
these have not yet matured. This will be the case under autarky, where the
consumption path of each agent is given by (c1;c2) = (R1;R2) (note that an
agent consumes either c1 or c2). By de…nition, an allocation is said to provide
liquidity if it insures the agent against such an outcome. Optimal liquidity
is then de…ned as …rst-best intertemporal insurance, i.e. as the allocation
agents would like best at date 0 if there were no informational constraints ex
post. Formally, this amounts to maximising expected utility subject only to
the constraint that consumption is feasible in the aggregate:
max qu(c1) + (1 ¡ q)u(c2)
2See Jacklin (1987) or Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988).
3In their original paper, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assume R1 = 1.
4subject to ( R1 ¡ qc1)
R2
R1








The second version of the resource constraint shows that 1=Rt can be
interpreted as the state-price density in a standard dynamic consumption
problem. The solution to this problem will then depend on the relative
magnitude of the intertemporal income and substitution e¤ects for the utility
function (1). Formally, it is given by the following …rst-order condition, which




Together with the resource constraint, this yields for the case of CRRA











Thissolution hasthe followingqualitativefeatures. If a = 1, then c¤
t = Rt.
In this case, the income e¤ect compensates exactly the substitution e¤ect and
autarky is optimal. If a < 1, then c¤
1 < R1 < R2 < c¤
2 (the substitution e¤ect
dominates), if a > 1, then R1 < c¤
1 < c¤
2 < R2 (the income e¤ect dominates),
and if a ! 1, then c¤
1 ¡ c¤
2 ! 0, the consumption path becomes constant
over time. For liquidity to play a role, we assume from now on, as in all of
the literature, that a > 1. In this case, agents want to consume more in the
short run than they have under autarky, hence need “liquidity”.
It is worth emphasising that this notion of liquidity, which corresponds
to de…nition 3 in the Introduction, is di¤erent from other equally plausible
notions of liquidity. In particular, in the spirit of de…nition 2 above, the “liq-
uidity of an investment opportunity” often denotes how easy it is reversible.
Taking the example of a being large and R2 = R2
1 shows that these two
notions of liquidity are very di¤erent. In this case, the investment is fully
reversible (long-term investment yields the same intertemporal return stream
as a sequence of short-term investments), but “optimal liquidity” as de…ned
here demands a considerable transformation of investment returns.
52.3 The market outcome:
Suppose there exist competitive markets for intertemporal trade in t = 0
and t = 1, in which agents can take market clearing prices as given (without
asking how they are determined). Obviously, in t = 0 there is no trade
because everybody is identical, and everybody invests 1 unit into the (real)
asset.
In t = 1, agents di¤er and can trade the asset (or equivalently, date 2
consumption). Let p denote the price (at date 1) of 1 unit of the asset (i.e.
of R2 units of date 2 consumption). In principle, each agent now has …ve
possibilities: (i) liquidate the asset and consume the proceeds, (ii) liquidate
the asset and use the proceeds to buy the asset in the market, (iii) sell the
asset in the market and consume the proceeds, (iv) sell the asset in the
market and invest the proceeds in new units of the asset, and (v) hold on to
the asset.4 Note that impatient agents will choose between (i) and (iii) and
patient agents between (ii), (iv), and (v).
Comparing the returns from (i) and (iii) yields the following asset excess
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p ] if p = R1
(1 ¡ q)
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p if p < R1
Not surprisingly, patient agents sell when the price is high, hold when it
is intermediate, and buy when it is low. Setting aggregate excess demand
equal to zero shows that in equilibrium patient agents must be indi¤erent
between holding and buying. More precisely, we have:
4Note the di¤erence between “liquidating” and “selling” (and similarly between “in-
vesting” and “buying”). Think of the asset as a potato …eld: each agent can either undig
the potatoes and use them (“liquidation”) or sell the …eld (for potatoes, in this one-good
economy).
6Proposition 1 (Diamond-Dybvig, 1983): In a competitive market for
intertemporal trade, the unique equilibrium price is p = R1, and the resulting
consumption path is the autarkic one, (c1;c2) = (R1;R2).
Note that there may be trivial trades in equilibrium, of patient agents
who liquidate their asset holdings with impatient ones who do not. But the
resulting allocation is no improvement over autarky. This proposition also
shows that the de…nition of liquidity used here is very di¤erent from the
…rst notion of liquidity introduced in the Introduction: Because of the price-
taking assumption, the competitive market is perfectly “liquid” (according
to the market-microstructure de…nition), but it does not provide “liquidity”
as de…ned here.
2.4 Banking:
I consider the case of a single bank (“the banking system”), which o¤ers to
take in the agents’ funds at date 0, invest them, and pay back a prespeci…ed
amount at either time 1 or 2.5
De…nition: A demand deposit outcome is a list (d1;d2, ®;A1;A2), where
A1 and A2 are a partition of the set of all agents, such that
1. each agent invests the fraction ® of her funds in the real asset and
deposits 1 ¡ ® with the bank in t = 0,
2. depositors a 2 A1 withdraw (1¡®)d1 at date 1 and nothing at date 2,
3. depositors a 2 A2 withdraw (1¡®)d2 at date 2 and nothing at date 1,
4. each depositor prefers her withdrawal date over the alternative one,




R2 ￿ 1, where¸ isthe size(measure)
of A1.
In this de…nition, d1 and d2 are the gross interest rates paid on deposits
over one, resp. two periods, and 1 ¡ ® can be interpreted as the size of the
banking system. Note that we have imposed symmetry ex ante (which is
reasonable because all agents are identical ex ante).
5In the basic model of this section, the case of competing banks is not di¤erent from
the single-bank case. In some of the later sections, this assumptions is not without loss of
generality.
7Proposition 2 (Diamond-Dybvig, 1983): Suppose that R1 = 1 and that
no markets for intertemporal trade exist. Then the …rst-best consumption
path can be implemented as a demand deposit outcome (d1;d2, ®;A1;A2) =
(c¤
1;c¤
2;0;fimpatientsg;fpatientsg). The implementation is unique if the de-
posit contract suspends convertibility in case of excess withdrawal.
Suspension of convertibility is a mechanism which has historically been
used as a “circuit breaker” in banking panics. In the present model it states
that the bank pays out signi…cantly less than d1 to at least some depositors at
date 1 if more than ¸ depositors demand their money back.6 The proposition
then simply states that, in the absence of markets, banks can provide optimal
liquidity, and that they do so unambiguously if suspension of convertibility
is imposed.
3 A First Critique
In important papers, Jacklin (1987) and Haubrich and King (1990) asked
the following question, which in hindsight is obvious: what is the role of
deposit contracts if a market for intertemporal trade exists in the model
introduced above?7 To clarify this question, one …rst must integrate the
concept of (Walrasian) market equilibrium used earlier with that of demand
deposits. Again, we assume that all agents behave identically at date 0,
which is plausible and standard, given that they are identical. Hence, market
activity only takes place at date 1.
De…nition: A market equilibrium with banking consists of a demand
deposit outcome (d1;d2;®;A1;A2) with ® < 1 and an asset price p, together
6A demand deposit outcome as de…ned above includes the notion of a Nash equilibrium
in an appropriately de…ned withdrawal game between depositors. Without suspension of
convertibility, a “panic outcome” is possible, too, in which all depositors withdraw at date
1.
7In his paper, Jacklin made in fact three important contributions, which should be
kept apart. First, he showed that other institutional arrangements than deposit contracts
(market based ones) can provide liquidity in the Diamond-Dybvig model. Second, he
generalised the model to less extreme, smooth preferences. His third contribution, the
“Jacklin critique” discussed here, however, was less convincing as it stood, because it
considered individual deviations from the banking contract at date 0, without modelling
trading at date 1 (if every agent but one invests in the bank, there is no market!). The
argument given here corrects this lacuna.
All these three points can also be found in Haubrich and King (1990).
8with net trades for each agent at date 1, such that all agents maximise their
utility from trading and the asset market clears.
In market equilibria with banking, the trading possibilities at date 1 be-
come more complicated. Consider …rst asset demand by the impatients at
date 1. For given d1;d2;®, they have four options. In all of them they with-
draw their deposits. Furthermore, they can (i) sell their asset holdings and
consume the proceeds and the deposit, (ii) sell their asset holdings, use the
deposit to buy the asset on the market, liquidate it, and consume the pro-
ceeds, (iii) liquidate their asset holdings and consume the proceeds and the
deposit, or (iv) liquidate their asset holdings, use the deposit to buy the asset
on the market, liquidate it, and consume the proceeds.
One easily checks that options (ii) and (iii) are always dominated if p 6=







¡q® if p > R1
[¡q®;q(1 ¡ ®)d1
p ] if p = R1
q(1 ¡ ®)
d1
p if p < R1
Asset demand by patient agents is more complicated, because they now
have seven non-trivial possibilities for behaviour at date 1. Yet, it is not
di¢cult (though somewhat lengthy) to derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Suppose the bank o¤ers a deposit contract (d1;d2) at
date 0 and a perfect asset market exists at date 1. At a market equilibrium











q® R1(> R1), all agents withdraw their deposit at date 1,
and the patients buy the impatients’ asset holdings with the proceeds
from the withdrawal, or
² d1 = R1, d2 = R2, p = R1, ® indeterminate, all impatients withdraw
their deposits at date 1, patients are indi¤erent between withdrawing
and not, and withdraw just enough to buy the impatients’ asset holdings.
Both of these two types of equilibria yield the autarkic consumption path
(R1;R2) to each agent, and in both banking is degenerate. In each type
of equilibrium, the return path from banking is identical to the one from
9investing directly into the asset (taking into account trading in the …rst type
of equilibrium), and hence, agents are indi¤erent ex ante between investing
in the asset or the bank. Not surprisingly, therefore, the proposition amounts
to a new version of the irrelevance result of banking in general equilibrium
theory stated in the Introduction.
4 A First Answer
In a pragmatic response to this result, Wallace (1988) simply proposed to
interpret the Diamond-Dybvig model di¤erently. In his interpretation, the
three dates of the model are periods during which the agents live without
interacting with each other. Banking then is a substitute for market activity
in a world where agents are isolated. More speci…cally, therefore, demand
deposits either concern only those …nancial activities for which markets do
not form, such as minor transactions services, or are used only by agents who
do not have access to existing markets, such as unsophisticated savers.8
5 A Second Critique
Even if one adopts Wallace’s (1988) perspective and assumes that agents in
the Diamond-Dybvig model are isolated, a basic incentive constraint must be
taken into account in the liquidity model of Section 2: agents can withdraw
and re-invest deposits privately (von Thadden, 1998). This point does not
concern the original model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), where R1 = 1. It
only becomes relevant in the more general model above when R1 > 1.
There are two interpretations of such a model of limited interaction. The
…rst is in terms of a fully speci…ed one-good economy with separated agents
in Wallace’s (1988) sense, in which each agent has access to the given physi-
cal production process. Alternatively, one can see it as a partial equilibrium
model of banking with individual selling and buying, where (R1;R2) repre-
sents each agent’s market investment opportunity (“the market portfolio”),
without trade being explicitly modelled. The latter interpretation also as-
sumes a limited market access of agents: they have access to the market
return, but are not able to directly exchange the underlying assets. Agents
8In fact, Wallace (1988) is concerned with another issue (aggregate risk) and notes this
interpretation only in passing. Probably he was not surprised.
10who invest, at any given date, “in the market” (de…ned by the return stream
(R1;R2)) or another asset, can liquidate such investments later and invest
anew, but they cannot trade them.
5.1 The basic model:
In its simplest form, the model is just the one presented in Section 2.1, with
R1 > 1. The optimal deposit contract solves the same problem as (3), with
an incentive constraint added that restricts second-period consumption to be
at least as high as what a patient agent would obtain from withdrawing early
and reinvesting:








and c2 ¸ R1c1:





This is a simple condition relating the investment opportunity (given by
(R1;R2)) to utility (given by a). In particular, if the market investment op-
portunity is completely reversible (R2
1 = R2), the …rst-best is never incentive
compatible (remember that a > 1). More generally, the higher the degree of
irreversibility,9 the larger the range of a for which the …rst-best is incentive
compatible. If R
a+1
1 > R2, the solution to program (5) is determined by the
incentive constraint, which forces the consumption path to be steeper than
…rst-best optimal. One easily calculates that
c1 =
R1




In particular, if R2
1 = R2, then c1 = R1 and only autarky is incentive com-
patible. The following proposition summarises these …ndings non-formally.




11Proposition 4: In the three-period banking model with R1 > 1 and
isolated agents, the scope for liquidity provision through demand deposits de-
pends on the degree of irreversibility of the market investment opportunity. If
the latter is fully reversible, no liquidity provision is possible at all. The less
it is reversible, the more liquidity can be provided through demand deposits.
5.2 The extended model:
The basic model discussed above su¤ers from an important shortcoming as
a model of dynamic insurance in that it only has three dates. This feature
implies that an agent who considers deviating from a deposit contract at date
1 faces no more uncertainty about future consumption, which makes stick-
ing to the deposit contract less attractive. In reality, of course, life goes on
and deposit contracts provide ongoing insurance against liquidity risks. One
would, therefore, expect that in a model with an in…nite number of dates
the incentive constraint introduced above has little bite: deviating from a
deposit contract at any point in time means giving up the future intertempo-
ral insurance the agent has found desirable to start with. Interestingly, in a
straightforward generalisation of the above three-period model to continuous
time, von Thadden (1998) …nds that this is not the case.
The model developed in von Thadden (1998) has a continuum of agents
who live during t 2 [0;1] and experience random consumption shocks which
are identically distributed and satisfy the Law of Large Numbers. The real
investment opportunity delivers continuous gross returns R(¿ ¡t) at date ¿
for investment at date t, where R(0) = 1 and R0=R is non-decreasing.10
In this model, the …rst-best again involves a ‡attening of the consump-
tion path with respect to the autarky path R(t), and deposit contracts must
respect the incentive for withdrawal and private reinvestment at every date.
Yet, although deviating from a deposit contract now carries the downside of
loosing future insurance, this incentive constraint turns out to be remarkably
strong. In fact, despite some technical complexities, Proposition 4 continues
to hold in the continuous-time model without any quali…cations. In particu-
lar, if the market investment is reversible, deposit contracts can provide no
liquidity even in the absence of trading opportunities.
10This last assumption is the exact analogue to the assumption R2
1 ￿ R2 made in the
three-period case.
126 A Second Answer
Building on earlier contributions by Bhattacharya and Gale (1986), Jack-
lin and Bhattacharya (1988), and Haubrich and King (1990), von Thadden
(1997) has extended the model of Section 2.1 by introducing a second invest-
ment opportunity. This creates a second insurance role for deposit contracts
and alleviates the depositors’ moral hazard problem described in the last
section in a remarkable way.
6.1 The basic model:
Consider the model introduced in Section 2.1 and assume that there is one
additional real investment opportunity (S1;S2) such that S1 < R1 and S2 >
R2 (“(S1;S2) is less reversible than (R1;R2)”).
Now each agent has a non-trivial, though simple, portfolio problem even
under autarky, namely the choice of how much to invest in each asset. How-
ever, even the optimal autarkic portfolio has the downside that whenever an
agent consumes, she consumes one asset whose yield is not optimal at the
time of consumption. Hence, in addition to the “liquidity risk” discussed
until now, there is a further “maturity risk”.
At the …rst-best, both these risks are fully insured away. In particu-
lar, since the proportion of agents who consume early is known in advance,
the optimal aggregate portfolio choice can re‡ect this. Hence, the …rst-best
problem is
max®;c1;c2 qu(c1) + (1 ¡ q)u(c2)
subject to qc1 = ®R1 (6)
and (1 ¡ q)c2 = (1 ¡ ®)S2;
where ® denotes the fraction of initial funds invested in the R-asset. The
solution to this problem is similar to that of Section 2.2. In particular, the




where the weights now correspond to the optimal rates of transformation







13for the …rst-best consumption pattern. Hence, the …rst-best ‡attens the
consumption path through the 1=a - term and eliminates maturity risk by
using the aggregate production pattern (R1;S2), which dominates each of
the individually available assets.
The construction of incentive-compatible demand deposit contracts then
is exactly as in the one-asset case of Section 5, with R2 being replaced by
S2. In particular, the introduction of the new S - asset does not change
the incentive constraint of depositors, because if depositors deviate, they
deviate by investing in the R - asset. However, the availability of higher
long-term returns (S2) allows to shift more income towards the short-run,



















Comparing this result with the one of Section 5.1, we can summarise it
informally as follows:
Proposition 5: In the three-period banking model with two assets, de-
mand deposit contracts can fully eliminate maturity risk and provide partial
insurance against liquidity risk. Liquidity insurance is higher than in the
one-asset case.
6.2 The extended model:
The basic model of before has an important drawback which again stems from
its limitation tothree periods. If we had started the analysiswith theS - asset
and added the R - asset, we would, as before, have created the opportunity
for maturity insurance (which favours the viability of deposit contracts),
but we would at the same time have tightened the incentive constraint by
introducing a more attractive deviation for depositors (which reduces the
viability of deposit contracts).
This is due to the artefact that when considering a deviation at date 1,
agents only have a one-period horizon, for which one asset (the R - asset)
is unambiguously preferred (no more maturity risk). The in…nite-horizon
model of Section 5.2 is a natural way to eliminate this bias, because there
is an ongoing insurance need in the in…nite-horizon case. Surprisingly, as
14shown in von Thadden (1997), the ongoing double demand for insurance
is even strong enough for deposit contracts to implement the …rst-best if
intertemporal risk aversion (a) is large.
Proposition 6: In the continuous-time banking model with two assets,
demand deposit contracts can provide …rst-best insurance if intertemporal risk
aversion is su¢ciently large.
Comparing Propositions 5 and 6 shows an interesting interplay between
the two insurance functions of demand deposits. To make the point, con-
sider the extreme case of full reversibility of the R - asset. If there is only
liquidity insurance possible (the case of Proposition 5), even the ongoing need
for insurance in the in…nite-horizon framework is not su¢cient to make any
liquidity provision incentive compatible at all. However, if a bank can o¤er
both types of insurance (the case of Proposition 6), it can always provide
full maturity insurance and some liquidity insurance, and can even provide
full liquidity insurance if intertemporal risk aversion is large, i.e. if the de-
mand for it is strongest. Insurance against maturity risk therefore stabilises
insurance against liquidity risk in the sense that the latter becomes incentive
compatible if the former is provided with it.
7 Conclusion
The model of Section 6 presumably overestimates the potential for liquidity
provision through demand deposits, because it assumes the extreme separa-
tion of agents à la Wallace (1988). In reality, agents do interact, although
this interaction is usually imperfect. In the extreme case of perfect Walrasian
markets of Section 3, Propositions 5 and 6 would unravel as the Diamond-
Dybvig result in Proposition 3; in the more realistic case of imperfect market
interaction the results would be partially preserved. However, this reason-
ing assumes that deposit contracts and asset markets exist independently of
each other and agents interact directly in the market. In reality, of course,
this interaction is mostly indirect, and it is often intermediated by the very
institutions that o¤er demand deposits.
Diamond (1997) has used this observation as the basis for an interesting
extension of the model presented in Section 6.1 above (with R1 ￿ 1;R2 = R2
1;
and S1 = 0), which shows that demand deposits can provide liquidity even
if agents are not fully separated. He assumes that at date 1 there exists a
15Walrasian market as in Section 3, but that a certain fraction of all agents
learns at time 1 that they will not have access to the market. The size of this
group is known at date 0, but not its composition, so agents are exposed to
the risk of individual exclusion, but can provide for it collectively. Banks now
do exactly that: Diamond (1997) shows that all short-term asset holding is
optimally done through banks (agents at date 0 only hold deposits and the
S - asset), and that banks typically trade at date 1 in order to reallocate
deposits among patient and impatient agents. The …rst feature is exactly
that of maturity insurance of Section 6 adapted to the partial participation
setting, the second feature shows how markets can actually be complements
rather than substitutes for banks in the creation of liquidity.
Another line of research, proposed by Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), also
points to the complementarity of banks and markets. They explicitly start
from the insight that trading can impose costs on market participants stem-
ming from informational asymmetries, and argue that demand deposits are
an institutional reaction to this de…ciency of markets. If the value of the
asset (R1;R2) in the model of Section 2 is uncertain and agents di¤er with
respect to their expected liquidity preference q, then there is room for institu-
tions to o¤er deposit or debt-like contracts, precisely to help avoid the costs
of market trading. Some individuals will prefer to hold deposits, which are
less information sensitive and, therefore, have low individual risk, others will
hold tradeable assets and incur the informational risk related to the lemons
problem in this market. Again, “banks” and “markets” naturally coexist,
but for reasons very di¤erent from those in Diamond (1997).
In sum, the examples considered in this paper show how in a speci…c
institutional framework - banksde…ned as demand deposit providers, markets
as anonymous, automatic exchange mechanisms, and with liquidity provision
as the economic function under consideration - banks do have a role to play,
but that this role depends on the characteristics of assets and the interaction
between banks and markets. The challenge is to extend such considerations
to more comprehensive de…nitions of banking and to more realistic notions
of markets.
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